Introduction to Human Rights

Overview: Introduction to Human Rights

Welcome to our comprehensive course on human rights, designed to provide a thorough understanding of this critical subject matter. Our curriculum offers a multifaceted exploration of human rights principles, international frameworks, and practical applications within communities. Through a combination of interactive lessons, insightful discussions, and real-world examples, participants will gain the knowledge and skills necessary to become effective advocates for human rights in their respective contexts.

Core Components:

Understanding Human Rights: This foundational module delves into the essence of human rights, examining their significance as universal principles rooted in human dignity and equality. Participants will explore the historical development of human rights concepts and their relevance in contemporary society.

Foundations of Human Rights: Participants will be introduced to key international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and major human rights treaties. Through in-depth analysis, they will gain a deeper understanding of the legal and ethical foundations of human rights law.

Principles of Human Rights: This segment explores the core principles that underpin human rights, such as dignity, equality, and non-discrimination.  Participants will learn how these principles inform human rights advocacy and policymaking.

International Human Rights Framework: Participants will examine the international human rights framework, including the role of international and regional human rights institutions. By understanding the mechanisms for promoting and protecting human rights at the global level, participants will be better equipped to engage in advocacy and awareness-raising efforts within their communities.

Community Implementation:

Promoting Human Rights Advocacy: Participants will discuss practical strategies for advocating for human rights within their communities, including grassroots organizing, public education campaigns, and coalition-building initiatives.

Building Human Rights Awareness: This module focuses on fostering a culture of human rights awareness and advocacy within communities. Participants will explore creative approaches to raising awareness about human rights issues and promoting dialogue and collaboration among diverse stakeholders.

Human Rights and the Prenate by Olga Gouni

Introduction to Human Rights en 1

Introduction to Human Rights en 2

Eισαγωγή στα Ανθρώπινα Δικαιώματα ελ

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Plato’s Concept Of Justice: An Analysis

D.R. Bhandari
J.N.V. University

ABSTRACT: In his philosophy Plato gives a prominent place to the idea of justice. Plato was highly dissatisfied with the prevailing degenerating conditions in Athens. The Athenian democracy was on the verge of ruin and was ultimately responsible for Socrates’s death. The amateur meddlesomeness and excessive individualism became main targets of Plato’s attack. This attack came in the form of the construction of an ideal society in which justice reigned supreme, since Plato believed justice to be the remedy for curing these evils. After criticizing the conventional theories of justice presented differently by Cephalus, Polymarchus, Thrasymachus and Glaucon, Plato gives us his own theory of justice according to which, individually, justice is a ‘human virtue’ that makes a person self-consistent and good; socially, justice is a social consciousness that makes a society internally harmonious and good. According to Plato, justice is a sort of specialization.

Plato in his philosophy gives very important place to the idea of justice. He used the Greek word “Dikaisyne” for justice which comes very near to the work ‘morality’ or ‘righteousness’, it properly includes within it the whole duty of man. It also covers the whole field of the individual’s conduct in so far as it affects others. Plato contended that justice is the quality of soul, in virtue of which men set aside the irrational desire to taste every pleasure and to get a selfish satisfaction out of every object and accommodated themselves to the discharge of a single function for the general benefit.

Plato was highly dissatisfied with the prevailing degenerating conditions in Athens. The Athenian democracy was on the verge of ruin and was ultimately responsible for secrate’s death. Plato saw in justice the only remedy of saving Athens from decay and ruin, for nothing agitated him in contemporary affairs more than amateurishness, needlesomeness and political selfishness which was rampant in Athens of his day in particular and in the entire Greek world in general. In additional, Sophistic teaching of the ethics of self-satisfaction resulted in the excessive individualism also induced the citizens to capture the office of the State for their own selfish purpose and eventually divided “Athens in to two histile camps of rich and poor, opressor and opressed. “Evidently, these two factors amateur needlesomeness and excessive individualism became main targets of Plato’s attack. The attack came in the form of the construction of an ideal society in which “Justice” reigned supreme, since Plato found in justice the remedy for curing these evils. Thus, we are to inquire in this study the nature of justice as prepounded by Plato as a fundamental principle of well-order society.

It is to be noted that before Plato many theories of justice were prevalent. The inquiry about justice goes from the crudest to the most refined interpretation of it. It remains therefore to inquire what were the reasons for which he rejected those views. Thus before discussing Plato’s own concept of justice, it is necessary to analyze those traditional theories of justice were rejected by him.

Cephalus who was a representative of traditional morality of the ancient trading class established the traditional theory of justice . According to him ‘justice consists in speaking the truth and paying one’s debt. Thus Cephalus identifies justice with right conduct. Polemarchus also holds the same view of justice but with a little alteration. According to him “justice seems to consist in giving what is proper to him”. The simple implication of this conception of justice may be that “justice is doing good to friends and harm to enemies.” This is also a traditional maxim of Greek morality.

The views propounded by Cephalus and Polemarchus were criticized by Plato. The view point of Cephalus was criticised on the ground that there may be cases in which this formula may involve the violation of the spirit of right and his formula does not admit of being taken as a sound universal principle of life. It is not right to restore deadly weapons to a man after he has gone mad. And the contention of Polemarchus was condemned by Plato on the ground that it was only easy to speak of giving good to friend and evil to enemies. But if the friends only a friend in seeming, and an enemy in reality, then what will happen? Then under such circumstances whether we should rigidly follow the defination and do him good or we may use discretion and do him evil? But to do evil to anybody, including one’s enemy was inconsistent with the most elementary conception of morality. Thus, this conception of justice regulated the relations between individuals on individualistic principles and ignores the society as a whole.

Thrasymachus who represented the new and critical view, propounded the radical theory of justice. He defines justice as “the interest of the stronger”. In the other words, might is right. For while, every man acts for himself and tries to get what he can, the strongest is sure to get what he wants and as in a state the Government is the strongest, it will try to get and it will get, whatever it wants for itself. Thus, for Thrasymachus justice means personal interest of the ruling group in any state or we can further define it as “another’s good”. Laws are made by the ruling party in its own interest. Those who violate such laws are punished because violation of such laws is treated as violation of justice. Socrates criticises the defination of justice given by Thrasymachus and he says just as a physician studies and exercises his power not in his interest but in the interest of a patient, the Government of any kind shall do what is good for the people for whom it exercises its art. But Thrasymachus advances some more arguments in support of his concept of justice and injustice.

An unjust is superior to a just in character and intelligence.
Injustice is a source of strength.
Injustice brings happiness.

Socrates attacks these points of Thrasymachus and throws light on the nature of justice.

Justice implies superior character and intelligence while injustice means deficiency in both respects. Therefore, just men are superior in character and intelligence and are more effective in action. As injustice implies ignorance, stupidity and badness, It cannot be superior in character and intelligence. A just man is wiser because he acknowledges the principle of limit.

Unlimited self-assertion is not a source of strength for any group organized for common purpose, Unlimited desire and claims lead to conflicts.

Life of just man is better and happier. There is always some specific virtue in everything, which enables it to work well. If it is deprived of that virtue, it works badly. The soul has specific functions to perform. When it performs its specific functions, it has specific excellence or virtue. If, it is deprived of its peculiar virtue, it cannot possibly do its work well. It is agreed that the virtue of the soul is justice. The soul which is more virtuous or in other words more just is also the happier soul. Therefore, a just man lives happy. A just soul, in other words a just man, lives well; an unjust cannot.

At this juncture the new point of view is stated by Glaucon and he put Forward a form of what was later to be known as a social contract theory, arguing we are only moral because, it pays us or we have to be. Glaucon describes the historical evolution of the society where justice as a necessity had become the shield of the weaker. In the primitive stage of society without law and government, man was free to do whatever he likes. So the stronger few enjoyed the life at the sufferance of the weaker many. The weaker, however, realised that they suffered more injustice. Faced with this situation they came to an agreement and instituted law and government through a sort of social contract and preached the philosophy of just. Therefore, justice in this way something artificial and unnatural. It is the “product of convention”. It is through this artificial rule of justice and law that the natural selfishness of man is chained. A dictate of the weaker many, for the interest of the weaker many, as against the natural and superior power of the stronger few.

Plato realises that all theories propounded by Cephalus, Thrasymachus and Glaucon, contained one common element. That one common element was that all the them treated justice as something external “an accomplishment, an importation, or a convention, they have, none of them carried it into the soul or considered it in the place of its habitation.” Plato prove that justice does not depend upon a chance, convention or upon external force. It is the right condition of the human soul by the very nature of man when seen in the fullness of his environment. It is in this way that Plato condemned the position taken by Glaucon that justice is something which is external. According to Plato, it is internal as it resides in the human soul. “It is now regarded as an inward grace and its understanding is shown to involve a study of the inner man.” It is, therefore, natural and no artificial. It is therefore, not born of fear of the weak but of the longing of the human soul to do a duty according to its nature.

Thus, after criticising the conventional ideas of justice presented differently by Cephalus, Polymarchus, Thrasymachus and Glaucon, Plato now gives us his own theory of justice. Plato strikes an analogy between the human organism on the one hand and social organism on the other. Human organism according to Plato contains three elements-Reason, Spirit and Appetite. An individual is just when each part of his or her soul performs its functions without interfering with those of other elements. For example, the reason should rule on behalf of the entire soul with wisdom and forethought. The element of spirit will sub-ordinate itself to the rule of reason. Those two elements are brought into harmony by combination of mental and bodily training. They are set in command over the appetites which form the greater part of man’s soul. Therefore, the reason and spirit have to control these appetites which are likely to grow on the bodily pleasures. These appetites should not be allowed, to enslave the other elements and usurp the dominion to which they have no right. When all the three agree that among them the reason alone should rule, there is justice within the individual.

Corresponding to these three elements in human nature there are three classes in the social organism-Philosopher class or the ruling class which is the representative of reason; auxiliaries, a class of warriors and defenders of the country is the representative of spirit; and the appetite instinct of the community which consists of farmers, artisans and are the lowest rung of the ladder. Thus, weaving a web between the human organism and the social organism, Plato asserts that functional specialization demands from every social class to specialize itself in the station of life allotted to it. Justice, therefore to Plato is like a manuscript which exists in two copies, and one of these is larger than the other. It exists both in the individual and the society. But it exists on a larger scale and in more visible form in the society. Individually “justice is a ‘human virtue’ that makes a man self consistent and good: Socially, justice is a social consciousness that makes a society internally harmonious and good.”

Justice is thus a sort of specialization. It is simply the will to fulfill the duties of one’s station and not to meddle with the duties of another station, and its habitation is, therefore, in the mind of every citizen who does his duties in his appointed place. It is the original principle, laid down at the foundation of the State, “that one man should practice one thing only and that the thing to which his nature was best adopted”. True justice to Plato, therefore, consists in the principle of non-interference. The State has been considered by Plato as a perfect whole in which each individual which is its element, functions not for itself but for the health of the whole. Every element fulfils its appropriate function. Justice in the platonic state would, therefore, be like that harmony of relationship where the Planets are held together in the orderly movement. Plato was convinced that a society which is so organized is fit for survival. Where man are out of their natural places, there the co-ordination of parts is destroyed, the society disintegrates and dissolves. Justice, therefore, is the citizen sense of duties.

Justice is, for Plato, at once a part of human virtue and the bond, which joins man together in society. It is the identical quality that makes good and social . Justice is an order and duty of the parts of the soul, it is to the soul as health is to the body. Plato says that justice is not mere strength, but it is a harmonious strength. Justice is not the right of the stronger but the effective harmony of the whole. All moral conceptions revolve about the good of the whole-individual as well as social.

source: https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anci/AnciBhan.htm#:~:text=Plato%20says%20that%20justice%20is,individual%20as%20well%20as%20social.

PLATO
The Allegory of the Cave
Translated by Shawn Eyer

(Plato: The Republic)
Plato’s famous allegory of the cave, written around 380 bce, is one of the most important and influential passages of The Republic. It vividly illustrates the concept of Idealism as it was taught in the Platonic Academy, and provides a metaphor which philosophers have used for millennia to help us overcome superficiality and materialism. In this dialogue, Socrates (the main speaker) explains to Plato’s brother, Glaukon, that we all resemble captives who are chained deep within a cavern, who do not yet realize that there is more to reality than the shadows they see against the wall.

Socrates: And now allow me to draw a comparison in order to understand the effect of learning (or the lack thereof) upon our nature. Imagine that there are people living in a cave deep underground. The cavern has a mouth that opens to the light above, and a passage exists from this all the way down to the people. They have lived here from infancy, with their legs and necks bound in chains. They cannot move. All they can do is stare directly forward, as the chains stop them from turning their heads around. Imagine that far above and behind them blazes a great fire. Between this fire and the captives, a low partition is erected along a path, something like puppeteers use to conceal themselves during their shows.
Glaukon: I can picture it.
Socrates: Look and you will also see other people carrying objects back and forth along the partition,  things of every kind: images of people 515a and animals, carved in stone and wood and other materials. Some of these other people speak, while others remain silent.
Glaukon: A bizarre situation for some unusual captives.
Socrates: So we are! Now, tell me if you suppose it’s possible that these captives ever saw anything of themselves or one another, other than the shadows flitting across the cavern wall before them?
Glaukon: Certainly not, for they are restrained, 515b all their lives, with their heads facing forward only.
Socrates: And that would be just as true for the objects moving to and fro behind them?
Glaukon: Certainly.
Socrates: Now, if they could speak, would you say that these captives would imagine that the names they gave to the things they were able to see applied to real things?
Glaukon: It would have to be so.
Socrates: And if a sound reverberated through their cavern from one of those others passing behind the partition, do you suppose that the captives would think anything but the passing shadow was what really made the sound?
Glaukon: No, by Zeus.
Socrates: Then, undoubtedly, such captives would consider the truth to be nothing but the shadows of the carved objects.
Glaukon: Most certainly.
Socrates: Look again, and think about what would happen if they were released from these chains and these misconceptions. Imagine one of them is set free from his shackles and immediately made to stand up and bend his neck around, to take steps, to gaze up toward the fire. And all of this was painful, and the glare from the light made him unable to see the objects that cast the shadows he once beheld.  What do you think his reaction would be if someone informed him that everything he had formerly known was illusion and delusion, but that now he was a few steps closer to reality, oriented now toward things that were more authentic, and able to see more truly? And, even further, if one would direct his attention to the artificial figures passing to and fro and ask him what
their names are, would this man not be at a loss to do so? Would he, rather, believe that the shadows he formerly knew were more real than the objects now being shown to him?
Glaukon: Much more real.
Socrates: Now, if he was forced to look directly at the firelight, wouldn’t his eyes be pained? Wouldn’t he turn away and run back to those things which he normally perceived and understand them as more defined and clearer than the things now being brought to his attention?
Glaukon: That’s right.
Socrates: Now, let’s say that he is forcibly dragged up the steep climb out of the cavern, and firmly held until finally he stands in the light of the sun. Don’t you think that he would be agitated and even begin to complain? Under that light, would his eyes not be nearly blinded, unable to discern any of those things that we ourselves call real?
Glaukon: No, he wouldn’t see them at first.
Socrates: It would take time, I suppose, for him to get used to seeing higher things. In the beginning, he might only trace the shadows. Then, reflections of people and other things in the water. Next he would come to see the things themselves. Then he would behold the heavenly bodies, and the heaven itself by night, seeing the light of the stars and the moon with greater ease than the sun and its light by day.
Glaukon: Indeed so.
Socrates: And then, I think, he would at last be able to gaze upon the sun itself—neither as reflected in water, nor as a phantom image in some other place, but in its own place as it really is.
Glaukon: Undeniably.
Socrates: And now, he will begin to reason. He will find that the sun is the source for the seasons and the years, and governor of every visible thing, and is ultimately the origin of everything previously known.
Glaukon: Of course. First he would see and then draw conclusions.
Socrates: That being the case, should he remember his fellow prisoners and their original dwelling and what was accepted as wisdom in that setting, don’t you imagine he would consider himself fortunate for this transformation, and feel pity for the captives?
Glaukon: I agree.
Socrates: Now . . . suppose there were honors and awards among the captives, which they granted as prizes to one another for being the best at recognizing the various shadows passing by or deciphering their patterns, their order, and the relationships among them, and therefore best at predicting what shadow would be seen next. Do you believe that our liberated man would be much concerned with such honors, or that he would be jealous of those who received them? Or that he would strive to be like those who were lauded by the captives and enjoyed pride of place among them? Or would rather take Homer’s view, and “rather wish, in earthly life, to be the humble serf of a landless man” (Odyssey 11.489) and suffer whatever he had to, instead of holding the views of the captives and returning to that state of being?
Glaukon: Truly, he would rather suffer a great deal than return to such a life.
Socrates: Well, here’s something else to consider. If such a man would suddenly go from the sunlight to once more descend to his original circumstances, wouldn’t his vision by obscured by the darkness?
Glaukon: It obviously would.
Socrates: And so, let’s say he is with the captives and gets put into the position 517a of interpreting the wallshadows. His eyes are still adjusting to the darkness, and it may take a while before they are. Wouldn’t he become a laughing-stock? Wouldn’t they say, “You have returned from your adventure up there with ruined eyes!” Would they not say that the ascent was a waste of time? And if they had the opportunity, do you supposed that they might raise their hands against him and kill this person who is trying to liberate them to a higher plane?”
Glaukon: I’m afraid so.
Socrates: Then, my friend Glaukon, this image applies to everything we’ve been discussing. It compares the visible world to the underground cavern, and the power of the sun to the fire that burned in the cavern. You won’t misunderstand me if you connect the captive’s ascent to be the ascent of the soul to the intelligible world (τὸν νοητὸν τόπον). This is how I believe, and I shared it at your wish, though heaven knows whether it is at all true. Regardless, it appears to me that in the realm of what can be known, the Idea of the Good is discovered last of all, and it only perceived with great difficulty. But, when it is seen, it leads us directly to the finding that it is the universal cause of all that is right and beautiful. It is the source of visible light and the master of the same, and in the intelligible world it is the master of truth and reason. And whoever, in private or in public, would behave in a sensible way, will keep this idea in focus.
Glaukon: I agree, to the extent I can manage to understand.
Socrates: Stay with me, then, for another thought. We should not be surprised that individuals who have reached this level might be unwilling to spend their time on mundane affairs, for would it not be that their souls always feel a calling to the higher things. If our illustration holds true, that would seem quite likely.
Glaukon: Yes, likely indeed.
Socrates: Now, would it be at all surprising for one who has been engaged in the contemplation of holy things, when he ventures into ways of degenerate humanity, to appear ridiculous in his actions? What if, for example, while his eyes were still adjusting to the
mundane gloom, he would be forced to appear in court to hold forth about the mere shadows of justice or the other shapes that flitted across the wall? And to engage in debate about such concepts with the minds of others who has never beheld the Ideal Justice?
Glaukon: It would not surprise me the least.
Socrates: But one who has his wits about him would remember that there are two things that pain the eyes: being brought from darkness to light, and transitioning back from light to darkness. Now, considering that the soul experiences the same discomfort, this man would not make light of another when he met with a confused soul. He would take the time to understand if that soul was coming from a luminous realm and his eyes were blinded by darkness, or whether journeying from the darkness of ignorance into an illuminated state had overwhelmed his eyes. One, he would consider fortunate. He would pity the other—and if he laughed at either, it would be less justified if he laughed at the expense of the one who was descending from the light above.
Glaukon: That’s a fitting way to put it.
Socrates: Of course, if I’m correct, then some of our educators are mistaken in their view that it is possible to implant knowledge into a person that wasn’t there originally, like vision into the eyes of a blind man.
Glaukon: That’s what they say.
Socrates: What our message now signifies is that the ability and means of learning is already present in the soul. As the eye could not turn from darkness to light unless the whole body moved, so it is that the mind can only turn around from the world of becoming to that of Being by a movement of the whole soul. The soul must learn, by degrees, to endure the contemplation of Being and the luminous realms. This is the Good, agreed?
Glaukon: Agreed.
Socrates: Therefore, of this matter itself, there must be a craft of some kind, which would be a most efficient and effective means of transforming the soul. It would not be an art that gives the soul vision, but a craft at labor under the assumption that the soul has its own innate vision, but does not apply it properly. There must be some kind of means for bringing this about.
Glaukon: Yes. Such a craft must exist.

…

Plato’s Allegory of the Cave Analysis